

MAKING THE 12 MONTH MOBILIZATION POLICY WORK

BY

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Disclaimer

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ARNG	Army National Guard
BOG	Boot On the Ground
CNGB	Chief Nation Guard Bureau
CONUS	Continental United States
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
DoD	Department of Defense
EAC	Echelons Above Corps
EAD	Echelons Above Division
FSP	Force Support Packages
FYDP	Future Years Defense Plan
GEN	General
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HMMWV	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
LTG	Lieutenant General
M-Day	Mobilization Day
NGB	Nation Guard Bureau
RC	Reserve Component
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SRF	Selected Reserve Force
TPFD	Time-Phased Force Deployment
TTHS	Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Student
USAR	United State Army Reserves

Making the 12 Month Mobilization Policy Work

Introduction

The ARNG is the oldest component of the United States armed forces. Its formation actually pre-dates the country, tracing its roots back to the first permanent militia regiments formed in 1636 by the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Since that time, the ARNG has participated in every conflict involving the United States from the various colonial campaigns to our current deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq).¹ To date, the ARNG has deployed over 428,000 Soldiers in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

This effort has come from a force that, since 2001, has had an average aggregate yearly strength of just over 348,650 Soldiers. To further put the current mobilization efforts in perspective, this is more soldiers than the National Guard mobilized for WWI and WWII. Twice the number for Korea, Berlin, and Vietnam combined, and seven times the number mobilized for Operation Desert Storm. With a better understanding of the magnitude of the ARNG's efforts for GWOT, previous mobilizations can be used to provide direction on where to head in the future and what alternatives exist.

History of Mobilizations

World War I

At the beginning of WWI, the size of both the active and reserve force was undersized to meet the US's requirements for the war. To overcome manpower issues, the Selective Service Act of 1917 was enacted.² During WWI, the ARNG furnished more than 380,000 men and two-fifths of the divisions in the American Expeditionary Force.³ To avoid time and legal constraints with the length of ARNG tours, President Wilson exercised the authority granted by the National Defense Act of 1916 and the Selective Service Act of 1917 to draft the ARNG into federal service as individuals, thus making it an all-active force.⁴

Training of new Soldiers before going overseas had long been a matter of debate, but in 1917 the War Department defined the required length of training as four months. The four month pre-deployment training focused on individual and small-unit skills, with larger units (brigade and above) never coming together to train as combined-arms teams.⁵

The Army was under-equipped and faced an immense and immediate demand for arms. The US industrial base was unable to ramp up quickly enough to equip the Army for either training or combat. As a result, the Army had to depend heavily on equipment supplied by the allies⁶ resulting in a force armed largely with the weaponry of foreign manufactures.⁷ WWI was characterized by the arbitrary four months training requirement and the Army's inability to use that time properly due to lack of equipment.

Because of the training difficulty in WWI caused by the lack of equipment, Congress determined that such a waste of manpower and time could not be repeated for future wars. The Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1930, later revised in 1939, authorized mobilizing the US industrial base to meet the military's need for equipment.⁸ This, however, was a slow process, and even after 18 months, resources were not available to meet the equipping needs for WWII.

World War II

With war imminent in August 1940, Congress approved the mobilization of the Reserve Component (RC) into federal service. One month later, to fill manpower requirements, the Selective Service and Training Act of September 14 1940, was approved, making history as the first peacetime *draft*.⁹ Once again, federalizing the RC coupled with the draft filled the Active Component (AC) shortage of manpower. With the addition of State troops it doubled the strength of the Army immediately.¹⁰ During WWII the National Guard fielded and deployed 18 infantry divisions, (300,000 men).

WWII mobilization was characterized by equipment shortfalls impacting training and the need to convert formed, unneeded, units to those meeting new battlefield requirements. As in WWI, training was slowed due to the lack of equipment and further exacerbated by requirements for units to transfer their equipment to US Allies under the Lend Lease Program. Significantly, training was further disrupted by converting

traditional horse cavalry units to artillery, antitank, and mechanized cavalry. Based on all the turbulence in creating and reorganizing units, training had to focus mainly on individual Soldier skills because of the influx of draftees and transfers of experienced Soldiers to the new divisions.¹¹

To correct this for future conflicts, on October 13, 1945, the Secretary of War approved post war policies drafted by the War Department General Staff for the National Guard. These policies outlined the ARNG under a completely new concept called Mobilization Day (M Day). Under M Day, the ARNG would be equipped, trained, and ready in the event the country was threatened by war.¹² As a result of this change, the ARNG became a combat reserve with formed, trained and equipped units. Having completed the job of rebuilding and reorganizing as directed by the War Department and just prior to the Korea Conflict, the ARNG was in the best shape they had been in years. However, this policy had adverse impacts on the Army's ability to meet manpower requirements for future conflicts. The peacetime draft would provide most of the manpower for the Korean Conflict.¹³ The Army also wanted to avoid the excessive combat exhaustion casualties of WWII. The solution limited a Soldier's time in combat, thereby dictating the individual Soldier rotation policy.

Korea

To meet the needs of the Korean Conflict 110,000 Army Guardsmen from 1,457 units, including eight infantry divisions and three regimental combat teams, were placed on active duty.¹⁴ With two of these divisions deploying to Korea, two went to Europe and the others remain in the US to back fill AC division deployed to Korea. However, the individual replacement policy broke unit cohesion as Regulars, Guardsmen, Army Reservists, and draftees were sent to Korea as individual replacements.¹⁵ This had the added detrimental effect of extending the time formed units could be ready for deployment to Korea. These adverse manpower effects were further exacerbated by limited access to or even the denial of the use of training sites. To further complicate deployment readiness the ARNG was ordered to surrender almost 25 percent of its weapons equipment to the Active Army. This forced the Chief of National Guard Bureau

(CNGB) to report these as training limitations of ARNG's units preparing for deployment.¹⁶ As a result, the ARNG had only 46 percent of its authorized equipment in the summer of 1950. The ARNG's contribution to the Korean Conflict was plagued by training disruptions due to individual replacement, lack of access to training sites, and cannibalizing formed units for their equipment. These problems, plus the large amount of Guard equipment drawn from the States by the Department of the Army (approximately \$700,000,000 worth of equipment and facilities in all), slowed the Guard's preparation for battle.¹⁷

Berlin Mobilization

The 1960's began with a partial mobilization of the National Guard as part of the US response to the Soviet Union's building of the Berlin Wall. The Berlin mobilization proved to be the most successful mobilization of the National Guard forces. As of October 1, 1961, the 32nd Infantry Division, the 49th Armored Division, and the 104 other non-divisional units were made up of 45,118 men. By October 15, 1961, they were mobilized and brought into the Federal service at 98.3 percent of their allocated strength. The 32nd Infantry Division and the 49th Armored Division, plus the majority of the non-divisional units were ready for combat in four months. They became members of the Strategic Army Corps. The time frame in which they completed training was two months less than required. The reason for this success was the "Six by Six" Plan introduced by Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, in 1955. He designated six ARNG divisions to be equipped and manned so they would be ready for combat in six months.¹⁸ The Berlin Mobilization is an example of what the ARNG can accomplish when fully manned and equipped at the time they are required to train

Vietnam War

President Lyndon Johnson relied on the draft to provide forces for the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1973. As an alternative to having a reserve component call-up for service in Vietnam, in September 1965, the DoD announced that the Selected Reserve Force (SRF) had been created. The SRF was made up of a 150,000 man force of ARNG and United State Army Reserves (USAR) units. The mission of the SRF was to provide

ready forces to offset any shortages in the active Army units deploying to Vietnam. It would also act as strategic protection against threats in Korea, Europe, or anywhere else forces may be needed.¹⁹ With increased training and recruiting funds, by July 1966, 88 percent of the ARNG SRF units were qualified for mobilization. Leaders believed that the SRF units could mobilize seven days after alert and would only need two months of post mobilization training. This would meet the goal set by the Army: mobilizing a unit that was at 93 percent strength in seven days and requiring minimal post mobilization training.²⁰ In May 1968, Guardsmen totaling 13,633 mobilized in support of Vietnam. They were to act as augmentees for forces in Vietnam and to be part of the Continental United States (CONUS) base army. Eight units deployed with strength just over 2,700 and over 6,300 as individual replacements.²¹ While the ARNG's contributions to actual combat were negligible, the Vietnam period again demonstrated its ability to achieve readiness when fully manned and equipped. This would prove vital during the next conflict – Operation Desert Storm.

Operation Desert Storm

Prior to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the ARNG was resourced at its highest levels in history. Overall, more than 62,000 ARNG soldiers participated in Operation Desert Shield, the largest National Guard mobilization since the Korean Conflict.²² When units were called upon to deploy in support of Desert Storm, 97 percent met or surpassed the deployment standard. Over a quarter of all units left CONUS within twenty days of call-up; two-thirds deployed within forty-five days.²³ Many agree that this success was due to the Total Force Policy, CAPSTONE, and the investments in personnel and equipment made during the President Ronald Reagan buildup.²⁴ Once again history proves that when the ARNG is fully manned and equipped, prior to war, as in the Berlin mobilization and the Vietnam War, it equals readiness to fight.

GWOT

As of 11 September 2001, the US has been involved in the GWOT. This has manifested itself in major combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq while maintaining presence in other areas such as Kosovo, Sinai, and the Horn of Africa. With Iraq the US was expecting another Desert Storm, where a superior force and overwhelming fire power would result in a short war and an equally rapid departure. No one foresaw or expected a prolonged US involvement or that the world had entered an era of persistent conflict. Expecting another short war, the US did not foresee the need for the multiple unit rotations currently causing the Army to be *out of balance*.

On first rotations, the RC was mobilized under Title 10 U.S.C section 12302 (Partial mobilization authority); an involuntary mobilization with length of not more than 24 consecutive months. Prior to January 2007, DoD policy authorized these involuntary call ups for cumulative periods up to 24 months.²⁵ The policy of mobilize-train-deploy led to Soldiers using 16 to 18 months of their 24 month mobilization clock on their first rotation; leaving four to six months unusable, due to the unfeasibility of mobilizing units for this short period of time.

Then, as the length of the GWOT grew, DoD was faced with the dilemma of a subsequent RC deployment. For the RC, 4-6 months left on the mobilization clock meant the second deployment would either have to be voluntary or a new policy would have to be written. In previous wars, this was not a problem either due to the unlimited supply of manpower from the draft or that soldiers did not come home until the war was over. Today, DoD is trying to minimize the impacts on Soldiers, their families, employers, and the nation in general from a war of undetermined length. As a result, the need for second mobilizations led to discussions with representatives of the National Guard, the reserves, employers, family members, and the state governors in 2005-2006. They agreed that reserve forces mobilization should be no more than one year out of every six, that whole units would deploy rather than Soldiers as individual fillers, and most of all, deployments should be predictable.²⁶

Transitioning from CAPSTONE to ARFORGEN

With the history of multiple deployments, the Army also recognizes the need for predictability to aid the process for synchronizing resources and preparing units. Prior to the implementation of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) concept, the Department of Defense organized, trained, and equipped the Reserve Component in the Cold War based on a tiered readiness, “first to fight” basis. Units that were scheduled to deploy earlier in the official time-phased force deployment (TPFD) list for the war plans received more people and equipment than did those that were scheduled to arrive in later phases of a campaign. The tiered readiness approach made considerable sense for many decades during the Cold War. Finite resources to spend on defense dictated that the majority of those resources were focused on active duty units that carried out the day-to-day missions of the military and maintained combat readiness in the event of a major theater war.²⁷ The Army knew it had to integrate the RC into national contingency planning in order to maximize their peacetime preparations for future wars. It also understood the importance of providing the RC predictability of where and who would enter the next fight.²⁸

In 1979, proper integration of RC units into genuine war plans began with the program known as CAPSTONE. Under this program, RC units were set aside for specific duties in the CONUS sustainment base or overseas. This program originally began in Europe and later was implemented in Asia and the Pacific. The purpose of the Force Support Packages (FSP) program was to provide the necessary Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units found in Echelons Above Division (EAD) and in Echelons Above Corps (EAC) tailored to support 5-1/3 CONUS divisions, one corps, one corps’ planning headquarters (HQ), one theater, and one theater planning HQ. FSP units were selected RC units deemed critical to war fighting capability that were expected to quickly deploy in the event of a contingency.²⁹ In 1994, CAPSTONE resulted in the program now known as WARTRACE.³⁰

Before the current ARFORGEN model, planning for wartime employment of RC forces was based on employment of pre-designated units with specified roles or missions. There were two features of importance to this approach: WARTRACE alignments and

Force Support Packages.³¹ The Army WARTRACE program aligned Army units under wartime gaining commands and provided units with detailed information concerning their wartime mission. This program organized and integrated AC and RC units to meet America's Army wartime requirements. The ultimate purpose of the Army WARTRACE program was to form the basis for unit commanders to enter into cohesive planning associations and to provide training opportunities with their designated wartime chains of command.

The WARTRACE plan had some draw backs. First, many units were never contacted or rarely received required training or planning guidance. Secondly, it gave units two different chains of command, with the peace time chain of command influence and agenda taking the lead role. WARTRACE had value to the RC because Force Support Packages units and Enhance Separate Bridges units were given priority over traditional units in receiving modern equipment. It also gave them some predictability of where a unit might enter the fight. The biggest problem was inflexibility. In 193X, GEN MacArthur probably envisioned a future like the GWOT when he stated “The enactment of rigid laws at a time when war is not imminent is not desirable because such action would probably result in measures so rigid . . . as to be a hindrance rather than assistance in the changed conditions of any future emergency.”³²

The experiences of both the Gulf War and the current GWOT have confirmed GEN MacArthur’s foresight. It demonstrates that tying RC units to fixed wartime geographical and command assignments is no longer a feasible basis for RC unit employment. Recognizing this, the Army implemented the ARFORGEN model to supplant WARTRACE as the primary framework to conduct contingency planning for RC units.

The ARFORGEN model prioritizes units’ readiness on a rotating basis. It also keeps certain units from being permanently designated as having priority over others. The rotating basis is based on three resource pools. These pools include a reset/training pool, a ready pool, and an available pool. The “reset/training pool” consists of units that have most recently returned from a deployment or some type of major commitment. The “ready pool” consisting of units that would be available for deployment, but will have

completed the reset process. The “available pool” consists of units, should a contingency arise, that are ready to deploy and also being pre-designated during the current year to deploy. It is important to note that even though a unit has been assigned to the “available pool”, this does not guarantee that the unit will be deployed. Available means that a unit is ready to be deployed should the need arise during this period of time.³³

New Mobilization Policy

Now that ARFORGEN provided a framework to provide predictability, other issues could be addressed. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) knew that over reliance on the RC was pushing it to its breaking point. To relieve the pressure, on January 19, 2007, the SecDef outlined a new mobilization policy in his memorandum, “Utilization of the Total Force”.³⁴

The SecDef’s memorandum was intended to achieve several objectives: develop a sustainable force rotation policy for the long term; spread the burden of operational demands across all components—Active, Guard, and Reserve; provide predictability to service members, family members, and employers; and maintain the all-volunteer force for the long war.

Six key features of this new policy are:

- Set planning objectives and a goal for active component units of one year deployed and two years non-deployed and the goal for reserve component units of one year deployed and five years demobilized.
- Minimize stop loss for both active duty and reserve forces.
- Establish a new program to compensate and provide incentives to active and reserve members required to deploy/mobilize early or often, or extend beyond new rotation goals.
- Provide hardship waivers that recognize exceptional circumstances facing members and families of mobilized/ deployed members.
- Manage mobilization of reserve component ground forces on a unit basis.

- Limit involuntary mobilizations of reserve component units and members to a maximum one-year.³⁵

There are many implications of this new policy for the RC. The most prominent change is being mobilized for a maximum of one year to include post mobilization training and time in theater cycles for deployment. Secondly, the reservist mobilization clock is reset to zero, allowing them to be mobilized for two 12 month periods in the next five years. This helps the GWOT by increasing the pool of available Soldiers. Finally, the elimination of mobilizing troops for 16 to 18 months allowing four months of unit training and 12 months of deployed time.

There are issues with the new policy that Soldiers, commanders, state headquarters, NGB, and the Army must deal with prior to mobilization day, if it is to work effectively. The policy change which had the greatest impact on the force is setting mobilization tour to lengths of 12-months. This 12-month period includes post mobilization training, deployment time and demobilization time. The goal is for 9 to 10 months in theater. Maximizing the deployment time is crucial to mobilizations, the total force, and the country, 12 month deployments mean more units can participate more frequently. Thus, the number of deployments can be spread across a larger pool of forces, and will most likely result in fewer or less frequent deployments for soldiers. The smaller the force requirement translates into spending less on defense or equal spending with greater improvements achieved.

To reach the goal of 9-10 month in theater, commanders have to minimize mobilization and demobilization times. Demobilization typically takes three to five days so there is little room for improvement. Therefore, finding ways to improve and reduce the time spent on mobilization is crucial. Four months to mobilize, as during the Cold War model, is unacceptable. Activities previously conducted during post mobilization must shift to pre-mobilization.³⁶ This necessitates more resources, Soldiers and equipment; have to be on hand during pre-mobilization training. In order to make this happen we must first provide predictability for all, secondly make a change in how ARNG account for recruit and non-deployable soldiers (establish a TTHS Account), thirdly equip the total force at 100 percent, and lastly there must be training changes.

Information must come sooner as to prepare for mobilization as well as the missions soldiers can expect to perform so that resources and training can be focused. The following recommendations elaborate on how to do this.

Recommendation

The nation can no longer afford the large standing Armies of the past, nor can it afford the inefficient practices recounted in the earlier history of the RC. The Army must ensure maximum utilization of the existing force. Working within the constraints of a 24-month mobilization clock, led to two 12-month mobilizations. From there, the formula is simple:

$$12\text{-months} - \text{Post-mobilization time} = \text{time in theater}$$

Given that maximizing deployment time means decreasing “Spin” (the number and frequency of deployments) as well as minimizing the size of the force required, our options are limited. Growing the force which is already in process, however, this is the most expensive part of the army. Leaving one option, minimize mobilization time.

Predictability for All

The ARFORGEN model is great for the combat unit in providing predictability and giving the Army a known ready pool of go to war combat units each year, but it fails to address the needs of the CS and CSS units. The Army must figure a way to either how to better integrate the current CS and CSS structures into the ARFORGEN model or change the structure. It is important for RC units to be aligned and integrated as early as possible against future missions associated with ARFORGEN and know what year of the ARFORGEN model they fall within.

Predictability provides units the ability to focus all resources and efforts. This becomes even more critical the greater the constraint on resources. If the RC units are aligned early against future missions, it will allow time for the RC units to take resources and make them a priority for the selected units. This aids them in manning at its fullest

level and for them to be equipped with the minimum amount possible before they undergo any pre-mobilization, collective training. Additionally this will establish task organization and unity of command early in the pre-mobilization process.

Change in how ARNG account for Recruits and Non-deployable Soldiers (Establish a TTHS Account)

A new policy is needed on how the ARNG accounts for their recruits and non-deployable Soldiers. Current policy requires that the ARNG count all troops - whether untrained recruits or injured soldiers - as part of a deployable unit - creating a false troop count. A unit may be filled 100 percent on the books, but not all of those Soldiers are qualified or physically able to deploy at any given time. The RC receives funds against authorized slots and can only recruit a Soldier for the slot that is available. Unlike the Army, which accounts for its recruits and non-deployable Soldiers in Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Student (TTHS) units, no such account exists in the RC and all RC personnel are assigned to the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) of deployable units.

There should be a consistency between AC and ARNG on the way recruits and non-deployable Soldiers are counted. This could be done with an authorized increase of five percent for E-5 and below for each MTOE unit. A plan will need to be developed on how the increase will be accounted. There are two possible ways that increases could be accounted. First, authorize each Guard State Headquarters a TTHS unit for the entire state or to increase each MTOE unit authorization by five percent. The second option would give commanders flexibility of managing his Soldiers and allow Soldiers to belong to the Guard's unit within their community. Once, Soldiers become qualified for deployment, they would be slotted against the units MTOE. Either plan will allow units to fill slots with deployable Soldiers. This would give the commander a better picture of his deployable strength and eliminate what LTG Clyde Vaughn, Director of the Army National Guard, call "hollowness". However, if this policy is developed, it would mean more troops which translate to increasing the ARNG budget.³⁷

Equipping the Total Force at 100 percent

Prior to war the total force must be equipped at 100 percent. The model of equipping units at less than 100 percent of required equipment can no longer be used. Units mobilizing to Iraq and Afghanistan have mandates handed down from the theater commander, which require all units to enter the operational theater between 90 to 100 percent of equipment required. This equipment must also be compatible with the equipment that the units are operating within theater. The ARNG can not make units whole without transferring a large supply of equipment from non-deploying to deploying units'. This set forth cross leveling in order to make sure that the deploying units could be fully equipped.³⁸

There are several reasons why non-deployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls due to equipment readiness being at less than 100 percent before GWOT. The first shortfall is units have been equipped at less than war-time levels, with the assumption that they could obtain additional resources prior to deployment.³⁹ This has lead to a cross-leveling cycle practice that the ARNG cannot stop. According to Government Accounting Office (GAO), the rate of equipment the ARNG was transferred to deploying units has increased 65 percent in a year; 35,000 pieces in June 2004 to over 101,000 in July 2005. The number of non-deployed ARNG units reporting their minimal amount of required equipment for mobilization dropped from 82 percent in October 2002, to 59 percent in May 2005.⁴⁰ However, in a number of cases this was a false picture. Units were counting substitute equipment authorized IAW AR 220-1 to meet training requirements, but failed to meet the deployment standard. When subtracting the substitute and equipment not available for deployment due to maintenance, the minimum required equipment on hand for deployment was at 39 percent.⁴¹ To further compound the drop in equipment readiness levels, the Army has required some units to leave equipment behind.

Current operations have created an unanticipated high demand for certain items such as armored support vehicles.⁴² According to the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2007, the Army National Guard has been directed to transfer more than 75,000 pieces of equipment valued at \$1.76 billion, to the Army in

support of OIF and OEF.⁴³ In some incidents, to meet the need of military police units' requirements in Iraq during 2004 and 2005, NGB was asked to convert non-military police units such as field artillery to meet this requirement. With only 3 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) in an FA battalion capable of performing military police duties, 44 additional ones had to be acquired in theater.⁴⁴

Finally, the ARNG has long standing shortages of certain equipment items. This shortage has forced more severe shortages in units that are non-deployed. It was necessary to do so in order for deploying units to have the training equipment to meet training requirements. For example, the ARNG supply of armored HMMWV had been depleted. The Army directed the ARNG to transferred 500 HMMWV from the Guard units that were non-deployed, in order for training sets to be created for units to use in deployment training.⁴⁵ This process has had a spiraling effect on the equipment readiness of the ARNG.

If the effect is going to be slowed down or even stopped, the ARNG must be equipped at 100 percent. The President, Congress and DoD must ensure that the \$23 billion in the FY07-FY11 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) remains a high priority so the Guard can remain responsive to both its federal and state missions.⁴⁶ Even with the FYDP, DoD needs to provide at least \$13 billion more over the next six years to reset Army Guard and Reserve equipment from ongoing operations.⁴⁷

Training Changes

Change to Stop Loss

Once fully manned and equipped, a unit has to have an increased degree of personnel stability prior to the start of their collective training. It is nonsense for a unit to achieve manning and training qualification levels only to have personnel melt away with expiring enlistments. The Army needs to increase its current stop loss policy of 90 days to 180 days. If a Soldier will not volunteer to extend through the training and the deployment, put him in a hold account and allow the RC to recruit another in his place. There are exceptions to every policy and what is best for a Soldier and his family.

However, a Soldier cannot be held back from promotion or hardship waiver that recognizes exceptional circumstances facing Soldiers and his family.⁴⁸ The 90 days stop loss is used to keep a Soldier from transferring or retiring within 90 days of mobilization or 90 days after de-mobilization. The influx of Soldiers in and out of units during collective training is a distracter which causes pre-mobilization training to increase, which leads to post mobilization increases, and reduces a unit's time in theater.

Increase Basic Training Slots

To end the backlog of Soldiers waiting to be trained, there needs to be an increase in Basic Training slots. Slots need to be made available early in the reset/training phase of the ARFORGEN cycle for Soldiers that need MOS training. This would allow them to meet the training requirement with their unit and not a training distracter later. Right now, 33,633 National Guard recruits nationwide are awaiting basic training. The goal is to reduce that to 12,500 at any given time.⁴⁹

In 2005, the National Guard had 376,105 Soldiers, however only 77.7 percent of them had completed the necessary training needed to be a qualified Soldier. The rate of fully trained Soldiers has increased to 89.9 percent in the last four years. This increase is partially due to restructuring, which has reduced the ARNG down to 349,581. To date, the ARNG Soldiers that are fully trained and qualified are 314,177. LTG Vaughn stated, "Readiness across the Guard is better than it's ever been in my 40-year career. It still has a ways to go." He explained "That the goal for 2010 is to have 95.1 percent of the force fully trained at any given time. That's a key percentage since it's the minimum requirement of fully trained and healthy Soldiers a unit needs to deploy." This can cause a unit to be delayed (i.e., decrease deployment time) in deploying to theater or cause them to be held in Kuwait before movement to Iraq... as was with the 39th Infantry Brigade (Arkansas ARNG) waiting on the arrival of Soldiers to fill its units.⁵⁰

ARFORGEN can work

Unfortunately, ARFORGEN will not work unless funds for equipment, manpower, and training components are found. Looking back at the Berlin mobilization

and Desert Storm shows the benefit of units receiving resources for training in advance. Training must be conducted on exactly the equipment that will be required for unit mission and must be provided at levels to conduct proficient training at the start of collective training. Even in the early stages of reset/train phase of the ARFORGEN, ARNG units must be provided adequate equipment to perform its critical Army mission; support of disaster relief; homeland defense and security. In order for the ARFORGEN to succeed, unit commanders' must be provided Duty Military Occupational Skill Qualified Soldiers early in the collective training phase. Also, manning must become stabilized. The influx of Soldiers during collective training limits the effectiveness and cost units' pre-mobilization training time. Bottom line: any training that moves from pre to post mobilization subtracts from the time a unit has in theater.

History shows paying later has always been more expensive. The US can no longer afford the luxury of preparing to be ready for a crisis; it must be ready, with the right units, at all times. The nation and the Army must provide adequate resources before a conflict or war starts. In other wars, as with GWOT, failure to do so only starts the spiral effect of cross leveling of resources. The decrease in unit's time in theater increases the demand for resources, requiring more units for the war effort.

Summary

LTG Blum, Chief NGB, said it best when he testified before the 110th Congress in March 2007,

"If we are to be successful in our goal of providing our soldiers a shorter total mobilization period and maximize time in theater for the combatant commander, it is imperative that we reduce post-mobilization training time prior to deployment and accomplish more of it at home station prior to the mobilization to active duty. We need the equipment to do that training. If units train regularly at home station with the best equipment, then little training is needed in the post-mobilization period immediately prior to deployment. A 100% optimally equipped Army National Guard will allow training, possible homeland missions, and deployments to all occur simultaneously."⁵¹

The Army National Guard Soldier has always been the basis for protection for our country. During the different wars of the United States, the mobilization policies have changed. Now, the policy has changed to a 12 month mobilization policy. In these 12

months a Soldier goes from mobilize, post mobilization training, to boots on the ground time, and then to demobilization time. The SecDef 2007 memo “Utilization of the Total Force” intends to achieve several objectives. It develops a sustainable force rotation policy for the long term. It spreads the burden of operational demands across all components-active, guard, and reserve. The memorandum provides a predictable time table for service members, family members, and employees. It also helps to maintain the all-volunteer force for the long war. It will take the predictability of the mission and the deployment time line, as well as having the personnel ready and the equipment in place, for this memorandum to be effective. Fifty years from now, policy makers will still be trying to figure out a better, more effective way to supervise our military. But until the force is grown or op-tempo slows down, the only way to maximize our resources is to increase a unit’s time in theater. More must be achieved during pre-mobilization training so a unit can minimize post mobilization training time. To accomplish this, the total force must be resourced with equipment and trained manpower at theater levels as early as possible. When this is achieved, the results will be readiness to fight.

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